Avoiding Financial Crisis in a Globalized Economy
From gold standards to modern exchange rates: Understanding currency systems and financial stability.
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 provides a clear illustration of how its underlying causes differed from the trade deficit challenges faced by some American companies today. The Asian crisis was not primarily driven by excessive government borrowing; rather, it stemmed from weak domestic banking sectors that had been recently liberalized. These economies were also heavily dependent on International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue packages, which were extended at unprecedented levels.
A currency’s exchange rate is determined by the interaction between supply and demand in the foreign exchange market—the global marketplace in which currencies are traded.
During the first wave of globalization, governments based exchange rates on the gold standard. Under this system, governments exchanged national currency notes for gold at a permanently fixed rate. In the United States, from 1834 to 1933, the government exchanged dollar notes for gold at a rate of $20.67 per ounce. By contrast, the post–World War II era introduced greater exchange rate flexibility. While the gold standard provided exchange-rate stability, this external stability came at the cost of significant domestic price instability.
The limitations of gold as a financial asset can be illustrated through the English case Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (1995). In this case, the House of Lords affirmed that a proprietary right—whether legal or equitable—cannot exist in abstraction. A right can only exist in relation to property that is specifically ascertained or identified. As a result of this legal principle, many equitable title holders lost rights to gold they had purchased from the exchange. This case underscores the fragility of gold as both a legal and financial marker of value.
Further risks associated with gold can be seen through balance-of-payments dynamics. As American prices of oil and commodities fall relative to the rest of the world—as projected in 2025—an underlying balance-of-payments surplus emerges. This surplus would draw gold into the United States. However, the resulting monetary expansion would push domestic prices back to their original level. This recurring cycle highlights the instability inherent in gold-based systems, where specie-flow mechanisms can trigger repeated bouts of inflation and deflation among interconnected economies.
Historical experience in the United States reinforces this point. In the 1890s, political movements argued that monetizing silver would expand the money supply and raise commodity prices. This movement reached its peak in 1896 when the pro-silver wing of the Democratic Party defeated the northeastern pro-gold faction at the party’s national convention. However, the Democratic candidate ultimately lost the presidential election to Republican William McKinley. This episode illustrates the political volatility and economic uncertainty that arise when monetary standards become entangled with partisan interests.
In conclusion, anchoring the international financial system to the U.S. dollar rather than gold can be viewed as a more stable and pragmatic approach. The postwar effort to establish an international monetary system that preserved domestic economic autonomy—while avoiding dependence on gold—has largely proven successful. By reducing exposure to the rigidities and instabilities of the gold standard, the modern system has enabled greater flexibility and resilience in an increasingly globalized economy.