Brooke Bobincheck

Stealth Is Not Invisibility: The Cost, Complexity, and Reality of Modern Stealth Technology

Stealth needs to be discussed given the current state of military affairs and the Pentagon's continued emphasis on stealth as the pinnacle of technological capability. If you're looking for one of my civilian or travel articles, don't worry-they will be back very soon. In the meantime, indulge this diversion from my usual content as a former military analyst; my team does (haha).

The reason for this focus is simple: the United States military is deeply invested in the concept of stealth.

However, many people misunderstand what stealth actually means. A common misconception is that stealth equals invisibility. According to the laws of physics, that belief is erroneous and fundamentally flawed.

Stealth does not make an aircraft disappear.

It reduces detectability.

Radar-Absorbent Materials (RAM) are specialized materials designed to scatter and disperse incoming radio waves, reducing an aircraft's radar signature and making detection more difficult for ground-based or airborne radar systems. These materials may include carbon-based treatments, foam-absorbing layers, and specialized polymers incorporated into an aircraft's structure.

However, this technology comes at an extraordinary cost.

The development and construction of stealth aircraft are among the most expensive endeavors in military aviation history. The Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit stealth bomber cost approximately $2.1 billion per aircraft, while the Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter cost approximately $1.68 billion per unit during the period when both aircraft represented the height of American technological innovation.

The United States military's fascination with stealth is understandable. The ability to reduce detection provides a significant tactical advantage. However, stealth is not a guarantee of victory, nor does it make an aircraft invulnerable.

The Cost of Stealth

The financial burden of stealth technology is especially apparent when examining the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II program.

The F-35 exists in three variants: the F-35A, F-35B, and F-35C. According to publicly available estimates, the approximate flyaway costs are:

• F-35A: approximately $82.5 million per aircraft
• F-35B: approximately $109 million per aircraft
• F-35C: approximately $102 million per aircraft

For comparison, the Boeing F-15EX Eagle II, a modernized version of the classic F-15 platform, costs approximately $91 million per aircraft.

Although the F-15EX may appear more expensive compared with certain F-35 variants, operational costs are a significant consideration. The F-15EX is generally less expensive to maintain and operate because it does not require the specialized facilities, equipment, and personnel needed to preserve stealth coatings and materials.

The same principle applies to other non-stealth aircraft, including the Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon and Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.

According to estimates from the Congressional Budget Office, the F-35's operating costs average between approximately $33,000 and $42,000 per flight hour depending on the variant, upgrades, and maintenance requirements. By comparison, the F-15EX is estimated at approximately $29,000 per flight hour.

These costs ultimately affect taxpayers.

The Three F-35 Variants

To understand the F-35 program, it is important to understand the differences between the three variants.

The F-35A is the conventional takeoff and landing version designed primarily for the United States Air Force. It carries a larger internal payload capacity and uses a traditional runway-based operating system.

The F-35B was developed primarily for the United States Marine Corps. It features short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) capability through a complex propulsion system.

The F-35C is the carrier-based variant designed for the United States Navy. It includes larger wings, reinforced landing gear, and an arrestor hook system for aircraft carrier operations.

While the United States is increasingly adopting unmanned systems and drone technology, the F-35 remains a central component of American airpower.

However, the aircraft's stealth advantages are often misunderstood.

Stealth Is Not Invisibility

The F-35's radar-absorbent coatings provide a reduced radar signature, but they do not eliminate detection.

When the aircraft opens its internal weapons bays, its radar profile changes. The weapons bay doors and internal surfaces create additional challenges because stealth optimization is not identical throughout every exposed area of the aircraft.

Furthermore, when external weapons are mounted on the aircraft's hardpoints, the stealth advantage is reduced significantly. The F-35A, for example, has external hardpoints that allow increased weapons capacity but compromise its low-observable characteristics.

At that point, the aircraft transitions from a stealth platform into a conventional combat aircraft with additional limitations.

Stealth reduces risk.

It does not remove risk.

The idea that stealth creates an unbeatable aircraft is a misunderstanding of both technology and warfare.

Stealth Does Not Guarantee Victory

Stealth provides advantages, particularly during the opening stages of conflict. It can allow aircraft to penetrate defended airspace, gather intelligence, and conduct precision strikes with reduced probability of detection.

However, if an adversary survives the initial attack, the situation becomes significantly more complicated.

The enemy will adapt.

They will analyze tactics.

They will improve detection methods.

They will adjust their defensive strategies.

Modern warfare rarely produces an "instant-win" scenario.

History demonstrates this clearly.

During Operation Allied Force in 1999, a Yugoslav air defense unit commanded by Zoltán Dani successfully shot down an Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk using a modified Soviet-era S-125 Neva surface-to-air missile system.

Whether the engagement was the result of careful planning, intelligence gathering, timing, or opportunity, the event demonstrated one important reality:

Stealth aircraft can be detected.

The F-15 and F-16 by Contrast

The F-15 and F-16 represent a different philosophy of military aviation.

The F-15 was designed primarily for air superiority. It is fast, powerful, and capable of carrying significant weapons loads.

The F-16 was designed as a lightweight, multirole fighter capable of air combat, ground attack, and support missions.

The F-16 is often affectionately compared to the "Honda" of fighter aircraft because it is:

• Relatively affordable.
• Reliable.
• Highly adaptable.
• Easy to operate and maintain.

The F-16 Fighting Falcon has become one of the world's most widely used combat aircraft, including through international partnerships and transfers to countries such as Ukraine.

By comparison, the F-35 requires extensive specialized training due to the complexity of its sensors, systems, and stealth capabilities.

An F-35 pilot must learn not only how to fly the aircraft but how to integrate its advanced technology into tactical operations.

Training, Ego, and the Illusion of Stealth

The advanced nature of the F-35 has contributed to a perception that American pilots are unmatched worldwide.

The reality is more nuanced.

The pilots of the United States Air Force and United States Navy are among the most highly trained aviators in the world. However, military effectiveness is not determined solely by technology or training.

Combat experience matters.

Organizations such as the Ukrainian Air Force have gained extensive operational experience through ongoing combat conditions. The Hellenic Air Force of Greece is also widely respected for its pilot training and operational proficiency despite its smaller size.

The issue is not whether stealth technology works.

It does.

The issue is whether stealth has been presented as something it is not: an invincible shield.

Stealth is a tool.

It is not magic.

The Reality of Stealth Technology

The challenges surrounding stealth include:

• High construction costs.
• Expensive maintenance requirements.
• Complex operational demands.
• Increased training requirements.
• The public perception that stealth equals superiority in every situation.

Stealth provides strategic advantages, but it does not eliminate uncertainty, human error, or enemy adaptation.

The future of military aviation will likely involve a combination of stealth aircraft, drones, advanced sensors, artificial intelligence, and traditional platforms working together.

Technology changes warfare.

But technology does not eliminate warfare's fundamental realities.

The aircraft may become harder to detect.

The weapons may become more advanced.

The systems may become more intelligent.

But no technology makes victory automatic.

Stealth is not invisibility.

It is simply another tool in the ongoing competition between innovation and adaptation.

The Fairchild B-52 Crash: A Tragedy That Changed Aviation Safety

It is June 24 as Brooke writes this piece, and those of us in the aviation industry would do well to remember what happened on this day.

On Friday, June 24, 1994, a United States Air Force (USAF) Boeing B-52H Stratofortress strategic bomber crashed at Fairchild Air Force Base outside Spokane, Washington, after its pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur "Bud" Holland, maneuvered the aircraft beyond its operational limits and lost control. The bomber stalled, fell to the ground, and exploded, killing Holland and the other three crew members on board.

The crash was captured on video and shown repeatedly on news broadcasts around the world. Today, the footage can still be found on YouTube, courtesy of a video uploaded by a USAF airman who recorded the accident from the airfield.

I was there.

I was only seven years old, but I was at the Base Youth Center near my father's office. At the time, my father was in charge of the maintenance detachment at Fairchild Air Force Base before his retirement.

Investigation and Legacy

The subsequent investigation concluded that the crash resulted primarily from three factors:

• Holland's personality and repeated reckless behavior.
• USAF leaders' delayed or inadequate responses to his previous safety violations.
• The sequence of events during the aircraft's final flight.

Today, the Fairchild crash is studied in both military and civilian aviation as a landmark case in Crew Resource Management (CRM). It is frequently used during aviation safety training throughout the U.S. Armed Forces to demonstrate the importance of enforcing safety regulations and addressing unsafe behavior before tragedy occurs.

The Crew and Their Mission

At 7:30 a.m. Pacific Daylight Time on June 24, 1994, a USAF B-52H crew stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base prepared to practice an aerial demonstration for an upcoming airshow.

The crew consisted of:

• Lieutenant Colonel Arthur "Bud" Holland (46), aircraft commander
• Lieutenant Colonel Mark McGeehan (38), co-pilot
• Colonel Robert Wolff (46), safety observer
• Lieutenant Colonel Ken Huston (41), weapons systems officer and radar navigator

Holland served as chief of the 92nd Bomb Wing's Standardization and Evaluation Branch, responsible for enforcing academic and flight standards throughout the wing. McGeehan commanded the 325th Bomb Squadron, Wolff served as vice commander of the 92nd Bomb Wing, and Huston was the squadron's operations officer.

The demonstration profile included several demanding maneuvers:

• Low-altitude passes
• Sixty-degree banked turns
• A steep climb
• A touch-and-go landing on Runway 23

The flight also served as Wolff's "fini flight," a long-standing Air Force tradition honoring an aviator's final military flight. Family members, friends, and fellow airmen gathered at the airfield to celebrate afterward by dousing the retiring aircrew member with water.

Wolff's wife and many close friends were present to watch the demonstration. McGeehan's wife and two youngest sons watched from the backyard of their nearby base housing.

The Final Flight

Using the callsign Czar 52, the B-52 departed at 1:58 p.m. PDT and completed most of the planned demonstration without incident.

As the crew prepared to perform the scheduled touch-and-go landing on Runway 23, the control tower instructed them to execute a go-around because a KC-135 tanker had just landed and remained on the runway.

Flying at only about 250 feet above ground level, Holland requested permission to perform a 360-degree left turn around the control tower. The request was approved.

Behind the tower was restricted airspace surrounding a nuclear weapons storage area. Apparently attempting to avoid entering that airspace, Holland flew an extremely tight, steeply banked turn while maintaining the low altitude.

About three-quarters of the way through the turn, at approximately 2:16 p.m., the aircraft exceeded a 90-degree bank angle, stalled, descended rapidly, clipped power lines, struck the ground, and exploded.

All four crew members were killed.

McGeehan occupied an ejection seat but had only partially ejected before impact. Huston, who also had an ejection seat, never initiated the ejection sequence. Wolff's seat was not equipped with an ejection system.

One airman on the ground sustained minor injuries and was treated and released from the base hospital later that day.

Holland's History of Rule Violations

The accident board concluded that Holland's aggressive, daredevil personality significantly contributed to the crash.

Numerous USAF personnel testified that Holland had developed a reputation for routinely violating flight safety regulations, including:

• Flying below minimum altitudes
• Exceeding bank-angle limitations
• Exceeding climb-rate restrictions

He even regularly parked illegally in a red-curbed fire lane adjacent to wing headquarters, demonstrating a broader disregard for rules and authority.

Repeated Warnings Ignored

During the May 19, 1991, Fairchild Air Show, Holland violated numerous safety regulations, including excessive bank angles, altitude restrictions, and flying directly over spectators. Senior leadership witnessed these violations but took no action.

On July 12, 1991, Holland again flew dangerously low during a change-of-command ceremony, descending below 100 feet, exceeding 45-degree bank angles, violating pitch limitations, and performing a wingover maneuver. Although he received a verbal reprimand, no formal disciplinary action followed.

In April 1993, during a bombing-range training mission near Guam, Holland violated formation spacing requirements and instructed his navigator to film bomb releases from inside the bomb bay, an action prohibited by regulation.

When the navigator reported the incident:

• Lieutenant Colonel Bullock allegedly did nothing.
• Lieutenant Colonel Harper reportedly instructed the crew member to conceal the evidence.
• Another senior officer allegedly stated, "Okay, I don't want to know anything about that video—I don't care."

Again, no meaningful action was taken.

More Dangerous Demonstrations

During the 1993 Fairchild Air Show, Holland once again exceeded bank-angle limitations and climbed more than 80 degrees nose-high. The climb was so steep that fuel vented from the aircraft's wing tanks.

Senior leadership, including Brigadier General James Richards and Colonel William Pellerin, witnessed the demonstration without intervening.

In another 1991 incident, Holland flew a B-52 over his daughter's softball game. During what witnesses described as a "death spiral," the aircraft reached an 80-degree bank angle while losing approximately 1,000 feet before Holland recovered.

What Is a Wingover?

A wingover—also called a wing-over, crop-duster turn, or box-canyon turn—is an aerobatic maneuver in which an aircraft performs a steep climb followed by a sweeping change in direction before descending and leveling out to fly in the opposite direction.

Although not specifically prohibited in the B-52, the maneuver was strongly discouraged because of the stresses it placed on the aircraft.

The Yakima Incident

On March 10, 1994, Holland led a training mission over the Yakima Bombing Range.

The minimum authorized altitude in the area was 500 feet above ground level.

During the mission, photographers recorded Holland flying approximately 30 feet above a ridgeline. On another pass, the aircraft reportedly cleared the terrain by only about three feet.

Fearing a crash, the photography crew stopped filming and took cover.

The co-pilot later testified that he physically grabbed the controls to prevent the aircraft from striking the ridge while other crew members repeatedly shouted:

"Climb! Climb!"

Holland reportedly laughed and called one of them "a p***y."

Following the mission, the crew unanimously decided they would never fly with Holland again.

McGeehan formally recommended removing Holland from flying status.

Colonel Pellerin instead issued only an undocumented verbal warning.

Believing his crews remained at risk, McGeehan made the decision to serve as Holland's co-pilot on future missions in an effort to protect others.

The 1994 Air Show

For the 1994 Fairchild Air Show, Holland designed an even more aggressive demonstration profile, including a 360-degree turn around the control tower.

During a June 15 briefing, Wing Commander Colonel William Brooks specifically ordered Holland not to exceed:

• 45 degrees of bank
• 25 degrees of pitch

During a June 17 practice flight, Holland repeatedly ignored those limits while Brooks observed.

No corrective action followed.

Colonel Pellerin even reassured Brooks that the demonstration appeared safe and remained within acceptable parameters.

Four days earlier, Fairchild had already endured another tragedy when former airman Dean Mellberg entered the base hospital and murdered four people while wounding 22 others before being shot and killed by a security policeman on bicycle patrol. The shooting understandably consumed the attention of base leadership during the days leading up to the air show.

On June 24, Holland again ignored the established flight restrictions, executing multiple 60-degree bank turns and a 68-degree climb before entering the final fatal turn.

No evidence indicates that either McGeehan or Wolff attempted to intervene.

Originally, Pellerin had been scheduled to fly that mission, as he had during the June 17 practice flight. However, he became unavailable, and Colonel Robert Wolff was selected as his replacement.

Because of the last-minute change, Wolff did not attend the pre-flight briefing and boarded the aircraft after engine start. As a result, he had no opportunity to question or object to the planned demonstration profile before takeoff.

The Investigation's Conclusions

The investigation produced sobering conclusions.

On May 19, 1995, Colonel Pellerin pleaded guilty at a USAF court-martial to two counts of dereliction of duty for failing to act on Holland's repeated safety violations.

His sentence consisted of:

• A forfeiture of $1,500 per month in pay for five months.
• A written reprimand.

Many considered the punishment light given the consequences.

The Air Force never disclosed whether any other officers involved received disciplinary action.

Critics argued that the tragedy reflected broader failures in enforcing aviation safety procedures and leadership accountability.

Although investigators concluded that policies already existed to prevent such an accident, the Fairchild crash demonstrated that policies are meaningless if leaders fail to enforce them.

The findings were rapidly distributed throughout the Air Force and became required reading in aviation safety programs.

Unfortunately, many of the same leadership failures resurfaced 16 years later when a C-17 Globemaster III crashed shortly after takeoff during an airshow practice flight at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska.

Project Almanac Controversy

Footage of the Fairchild crash was later used in the 2015 film Project Almanac to depict a fictional airline disaster.

The decision sparked outrage among the families of Colonels Wolff and McGeehan.

After initially claiming the footage depicted a 2009 Tokyo accident, Paramount Pictures acknowledged the error. Producer Michael Bay later apologized to the families, and, at his request, the footage was removed from the film's theatrical release and promotional trailers.

Final Thoughts

Thank you for learning with us today at Brooke In The Air Travel.

This tragedy remains one of aviation history's clearest reminders that safety regulations exist for a reason, and that leadership has a responsibility not only to create standards but to enforce them consistently.

You can learn more by visiting brookeintheairtravel.net.

Aviation Heroes of History

I feel the need to start yet another new series. We shall see whether this becomes a true series or simply a one- or two-article sub-series. Here's hoping.

This series will be known as Aviation Heroes of History, capitalizing on my background with the Institute for the Study of War scholarship program, my love of aviation, and my passion for historical research. I hope you'll forgive this indulgence because I think you'll enjoy learning a thing or two about aviation history.

We'll start the series with an airman of the United States Army Air Corps (now the U.S. Air Force) on Sunday, December 7, 1941. I refer to none other than American hero and aviation pioneer 2nd Lieutenant George Welch Jr. Welch is famed for his exploits during the horrific day when the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, resulting in nearly 2,000 deaths.

The focus of this series is aviation heroism, so I will do my best not to get sidetracked. I apologize in advance if that happens. We'll begin with a brief biography of each airman.

A Short Bio

Lieutenant George Schwartz Welch was born George Lewis Schwartz Jr. to George Lewis Schwartz Sr. and Julia Ann Welch. His parents later changed the family's surname to Welch to avoid the anti-German sentiment in American society that followed World War I. His father was a senior research chemist at DuPont's Experimental Station in Wilmington, Delaware, while his mother gave up her career aspirations to become a homemaker.

George had a younger brother, Dehn Schwartz Welch, who lived until 1999 and served in the U.S. Army until the end of World War II in 1945. Unfortunately, little is known about his brother.

George attended St. Andrew's School, a private coeducational boarding school in Delaware, although little—even in his biography—is documented about his time there.

George completed three years of a mechanical engineering degree at Purdue University before joining the Army Air Corps in 1939. He later completed his degree after the war while serving as a test pilot for the U.S. Air Force. While attending Purdue, he was initiated into the Delta Upsilon fraternity.

His Army Air Corps flight training included Brooks Field, Kelly Field, and Randolph Field (now Randolph Air Force Base) in San Antonio, Texas, as well as Hamilton Field in Novato, California. Most of these installations remain active military facilities; only Brooks Field and Hamilton Field have been closed. These schools taught him flight operations, gunnery, navigation, and the foundational skills that would eventually make him an ace.

After receiving his wings and commission in January 1941, Welch was assigned to the 47th Pursuit Squadron, 15th Pursuit Group, U.S. Army Air Corps, at Wheeler Field on Oahu, Hawaii, in February 1941. This assignment set the stage for his moment of glory.

December 7, 1941

In the early morning hours of December 7, 1941, 2nd Lieutenant Welch and fellow pilot 2nd Lieutenant Kenneth Taylor were returning from a Christmas dinner and dance at a rooftop hotel in Waikiki that had ended with an all-night poker game. They were still wearing their mess dress uniforms when the Japanese launched the first wave of attacks on Pearl Harbor.

Welch telephoned the auxiliary Haleiwa Fighter Strip on Oahu's North Shore and instructed personnel to prepare two Curtiss P-40B Tomahawk fighters for takeoff.

Taylor immediately drove his Buick at high speed to Haleiwa to join the battle. As they climbed into their P-40s, the crew chiefs informed them they should disperse the aircraft rather than engage the enemy.

"To hell with that," Welch reportedly replied.

Taking off with only .30-caliber ammunition in the wing guns, Welch claimed two Aichi D3A "Val" dive bombers over Ewa Mooring Mast Field. The first Japanese aircraft was damaged but managed to return to its carrier. The second was finished off by Kenneth Taylor shortly before he landed at Wheeler Field, which was under attack, to reload his two cowl-mounted .50-caliber machine guns. Welch landed minutes later to do the same.

The P-40B carried four machine guns: two wing-mounted .30-caliber guns and two cowl-mounted .50-caliber guns.

On his second sortie, Welch shot down another "Val" dive bomber that was attacking Taylor. The aircraft crashed near the town of Wahiawa, a suburb of Honolulu. He then destroyed a Mitsubishi A6M Zero approximately five miles west of Barbers Point.

For geographical context, Ewa Mooring Mast Field later became Marine Corps Air Station Ewa, which is now closed.

The Distinguished Service Cross

Welch was promoted to captain and nominated for the Congressional Medal of Honor. However, the nomination was denied because he and Taylor had technically violated standing orders by flying into combat without authorization.

Instead, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, on behalf of the Army Air Corps, awarded Welch the Distinguished Service Cross, the Army's second-highest award for valor.

Part of Welch's Distinguished Service Cross citation reads:

"...During this combat, his plane was struck by three bullets from the rear gun of the ship he was attacking, one striking his motor, one the propeller, and one the cowling... Lieutenant Welch's initiative, presence of mind, coolness under fire against overwhelming odds in his first battle, expert maneuvering of his plane, and determined action contributed to a large extent toward driving off this sudden unexpected enemy air attack..."

American Equipment Losses at Pearl Harbor

For context, American losses at Pearl Harbor included eight battleships, one training ship, three cruisers, four destroyers, and numerous support vessels. Below is a summary of the major losses.

Battleships

• USS Arizona — hit by four armor-piercing bombs; exploded and was a total loss. 1,177 dead.
• USS Oklahoma — hit by five torpedoes; capsized and was later salvaged before sinking en route to scrapping in 1947. 429 dead.
• USS West Virginia — hit by two bombs and seven torpedoes; returned to service in July 1944. 106 dead.
• USS California — hit by two bombs and two torpedoes; returned to service in January 1944. 104 dead.
• USS Nevada — hit by six bombs and one torpedo; beached and returned to service in October 1942. 60 dead.
• USS Pennsylvania — damaged while in dry dock; remained in service. 9 dead.
• USS Tennessee — hit by two bombs; returned to service in February 1942. 5 dead.
• USS Maryland — hit by two bombs; returned to service in February 1942. 4 dead.

Most of the salvaged battleships later fought in the Battle of Surigao Strait, the last battleship-versus-battleship engagement in history.

Training Ship

• USS Utah — hit by two torpedoes; capsized and became a total loss. 64 dead.

Cruisers

• USS Helena — hit by one torpedo; returned to service in January 1942.
• USS Raleigh — hit by one torpedo; returned to service in February 1942.
• USS Honolulu — sustained light damage from a near miss and remained in service throughout the war.

Destroyers

• USS Cassin — heavily damaged in dry dock; rebuilt and returned to service in February 1944.
• USS Downes — burned after catching fire from USS Cassin; rebuilt and returned to service in November 1943.
• USS Helm — damaged by near misses but remained operational.
• USS Shaw — hit by three bombs; returned to service in June 1942.

Auxiliary Support Vessels

• USS Oglala — capsized after damage from a torpedo explosion; later returned to service.
• USS Vestal — damaged by bombs and the explosion aboard USS Arizona; returned to service by August 1942.
• USS Curtiss — damaged by a bomb and a crashing Japanese aircraft. 19 dead.
• USS Sotoyomo — damaged by the explosion aboard USS Shaw; later repaired.
• USS YFD-2 — damaged and sunk before later returning to service.

Test Pilot for North American Aviation

In the spring of 1944, Welch was approached by North American Aviation to become a company test pilot. With General Arnold's recommendation, Welch resigned his commission in the U.S. Army Air Forces and accepted the position.

His final military rank was major in the Air Force Reserve. His military career spanned from November 13, 1944, until his retirement on April 1, 1953, encompassing service during both World War II and the Korean War.

As a North American Aviation test pilot, Welch flew prototypes of the Navy's FJ-1 Fury and later the Army Air Forces' XP-86.

North American initially proposed a straight-wing XP-86, which the Army Air Forces accepted on May 1, 1945. On November 1, using captured German aerodynamic research, the company proposed a major redesign featuring 35-degree swept wings. This aircraft evolved into the legendary F-86 Sabre, one of the U.S. Air Force's first premier jet fighters.

Did Welch Break the Sound Barrier Before Yeager?

In Aces Wild: The Race for Mach 1 (1998), fellow North American test pilot Al Blackburn speculated that Welch may have broken the sound barrier two weeks before Chuck Yeager during an early XP-86 test flight. Welch himself never made that claim.

Robert Kempel, co-author of The Race for Mach I, disputed Blackburn's theory, arguing that the XP-86's underpowered engine made supersonic flight impossible.

Kempel acknowledged that the airframe was capable of transonic speeds, but the interim J35-C-3 engine limited its performance. Legendary test pilot Bob Hoover, who flew chase aircraft for both Welch and Yeager, also disputed the claim, stating that Welch's aircraft was undergoing repairs on the day in question.

Official flight records indicate Welch reached approximately Mach 0.93 during a powered dive from 45,114 feet on November 13, 1947. North American documented these results during its High-Mach Number Investigation, and the U.S. Air Force later confirmed them during Phase II testing.

Korea and the F-100 Super Sabre

During the Korean War, Welch served as North American Aviation's chief test pilot, engineer, and instructor. He reportedly shot down several MiG-15s while supposedly supervising student pilots. Because he had been ordered not to engage in combat, official credit for those victories was reportedly given to his students.

Following the war, Welch returned to flight testing, this time flying the F-100 Super Sabre while Chuck Yeager piloted the chase aircraft.

On May 25, 1953, Welch became the first person to break the sound barrier in level flight in an F-100.

Welch's Death

Stability issues plagued the F-100 flight test program. On October 12, 1954, Welch's F-100A Super Sabre disintegrated during a 7-G pullout at Mach 1.55 from 45,000 feet and crashed on Rosamond Dry Lake in California's Mojave Desert.

Welch was found still strapped into his ejection seat and critically injured. He was evacuated by helicopter but was pronounced dead upon arrival at the U.S. Air Force Plant 42 hospital in Palmdale, California.

He is buried at Arlington National Cemetery.

I hope you found this article enlightening, informative, and entertaining—and perhaps that it made you think a little differently about one of aviation's greatest heroes.

If you're interested in learning more, I highly recommend Aces Wild: The Race for Mach 1 by Robert Kempel. It is a fascinating read and offers valuable insights into George Welch that are difficult to find elsewhere.

And remember, you can learn more about aviation history, travel tips, and itinerary planning by booking a consultation with Brooke In The Air Travel at brookeintheairtravel.net.