Strategic Analysis of the Current Military Situation(s)
Why the U.S. Military Lacks the Resources for Prolonged Occupation or Large-Scale Conflict
Lately, the U.S. president has focused on what is widely considered by the international community to be warmongering, with vague stated goals such as occupying portions of the Middle East, Greenland, or Venezuela. Aside from political perspectives, I want to offer a relatively unbiased, military-oriented viewpoint of what an occupation would involve. I apologize, but this administration and ongoing global situations have got me thinking, and I need to write this out. We will return to writing about travel very shortly, but my time as a military analyst will not allow me to let this go.
There are over 7,000 combat aircraft across the United States Armed Forces, including the fleet air arms of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, and the combat forces (differentiated from tanker and cargo elements) of the U.S. Air Force. The Air Force itself has over 5,000 operational aircraft in general, but most of these—and most crucially—are a mixture of KC-135 Stratotanker and KC-46 Pegasus refueling aircraft, along with C-17 Globemaster III and C-5M Super Galaxy cargo aircraft. These belong to the Air Mobility Command (AMC), one of the named operational commands within the U.S. Air Force’s organizational structure.
Indeed, AMC is the world’s largest transport organization across all fields, theaters, and nation-states, and serves as the metaphorical backbone of NATO.
The U.S. Army has over 945,000 personnel spread across active duty, reserves, and the National Guard. However, this comes with several caveats. Approximately 450,000 personnel are stationed at various bases around the globe, and over 350,000 active-duty personnel are involved in base security duties, peacekeeping activities, and joint-force allied training with NATO allies worldwide, as long as that alliance holds. At least 350,000 soldiers belong to the National Guard, the de facto domestic militia unit of the United States. These forces can only be fully federalized—typically for deployments involving more than 1,500 troops—through an act of Congress. Otherwise, they are generally deployed by the governor of the state to which they belong and in which they reside.
The remaining troops belong to the U.S. Army Reserve. These forces are composed of “weekend warriors” who maintain civilian jobs and serve in the military one weekend a month and up to two weeks a year. In other words, the Army Reserve is not their full-time occupation, unless they are activated and integrated into the regular U.S. Army through congressional authorization.
The United States military does not, to put it succinctly, have the resources for a prolonged military occupation, much less a war with a peer or near-peer adversary (NPA), such as the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.), Russia (if it can truly be considered a near-peer adversary anymore), or India. North Korea is not considered an NPA, as it does not meet the necessary requirements.
The United States has, according to some statistical analyses, the resources, infrastructure, and combat capability for approximately three and a half weeks of sustained warfare before supplies become critically depleted.
The Air Mobility Command of the U.S. Air Force—the logistical backbone of the entire U.S. military—would have limited roles in such a scenario beyond transporting troops from bases to forward operating bases (FOBs). AMC tanker wings would conduct daily sorties, refueling cargo aircraft, fighters, bombers, and other tankers.
Ukraine has demonstrated that drone-coordinated warfare is the direction of future conflict. While the U.S. has drone capabilities, they are not at the same scale as those demonstrated by Ukraine, and in some respects, Iran. Additionally, there is a non-equipment-related factor: the United States does not consistently maintain respect for adversaries it engages, particularly in modern conflicts.
As Sun Tzu wrote in The Art of War: “If you know your enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”
The argument here is that the U.S. often dehumanizes or underestimates adversaries early, then spends significant time adjusting strategy after encountering resistance.
The ultimate reality, in this framing, is that the United States would need to either achieve rapid decisive victory within the first two to three weeks of conflict or face severe logistical constraints and potential operational failure.
Iran has shown this dynamic in recent conflicts; within six weeks of fighting, the U.S. Navy reportedly expended approximately 1,300 cruise missiles and subsequently sought congressional approval for a $1.2 trillion taxpayer-funded replacement funding package.
We will return to travel and aviation-centered articles shortly. See more at brookeintheairtravel.net
